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DCI/ICS-86-0870
31 July 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Report

1. Your marginalia on subject included a question relative to the section dealing with national level management:

"Why not simply broaden the SIG-I Charter?"

2. I submit there are two interrelated reasons.

a. This first is substantive and is rooted in the context in which the SIG-I was established. NSDD-2 addresses the three major areas of foreign policy, defense policy, and intelligence; confirms that the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI are the President's principal advisors therefor. You, for example, are empowered with overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to intelligence matters to include preparation of intelligence policy papers requiring NSC consideration. The NSDD then goes on to establish SIGs for the three areas, chaired, quite appropriately, by the respective principal advisors. The purpose of these SIGs is both to assist the "NSC at large," and the principal advisors "in fulfilling their responsibilities." The preeminence of the principal advisors is reflected not only in the chairmanship of the SIG, but in authority to establish the secretariat (composed, in the case of the SIG-I, of "personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. . ."). Moreover, as the Director of Central Intelligence you have, appropriately, control of the agenda.

I don't believe it would be practical to extend the SIG-I charter, as established in NSDD-2, and thus make you principal advisor on countermeasures matters of interagency import. The NSDD-145 mechanisms now provide national level advice and initiate policy in two key security disciplines; and the Director, ISOO, does likewise in a third and, prospectively, will also in a fourth. Even if these national level advisory mechanisms were not in existence, the fact that the great bulk of countemeasures activities proceed outside the intelligence community needs to be taken into account.

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Thus it seems appropriate to look for an organizational solution outside the context of NSDD-2. The concept of the SIG Space and SIG Technology Transfer suggests a workable model. There being no principal advisor in those two functional areas, the President and NSC look to those two entities for corporate advice. Similarly, a SIG-CI and Security would be empowered corporately as contrasted with the SIG-I which, in perception if not in fact, exists to assist you. The Chairman, SIG-CI and Security, would be first among equals, but not principal advisor on counterintelligence and countermeasures matters.

b. The second reason has to do largely with perception. I can best illustrate by recalling the meeting, two months ago, when the reorganization of the SIG-I structure was discussed. The agenda had to do mostly with countermeasures which (I belabor the point) are principally related to non-intelligence information and activities. Roughly half the attendees at the table were your people (DCI, DDCI; Executive Director, CIA; Director and Deputy Director, IC Staff; Secretary, SIG-I; and Director, CCIS).

With a separate SIG, the expanded CCISCM staff would be elevated to the status of Secretariat directly responsible to the SIG; there would be no need for other Intelligence Community staff at the SIG meetings; there would be increased membership from the other departments and agencies; and, in your absence, the chairmanship would logically vest in either the Director, FBI or Deputy Secretary, Defense, depending on the agenda. Finally, consistent with the proposed functions, the Secretariat should be interagency in composition.

3. I trust this clarifies the underlying rationale for the proposed SIG-CI&S.

Richard G. Stilwell



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